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Corporate Codes as Private Co-Regulatory
Instruments in Corporate Governance and
Responsibility and Their Enforcement
JAN EIJSBOUTS*
ABSTRACT

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) codes have gained a
prominent role as tools in self-regulation for companies to establish their
basic values, norms, and rules that condition the conduct of directors,
managers, employees, and-increasingly-ofsuppliers. This development
must be seen in the light of two importantparadigmaticchanges in the
concepts both of CSR and corporategovernance. The former is no longer
purely voluntary and the latter has become inclusive of CSR, each with
far-reaching consequences for the raison d'itre and the place and
function of the codes in the smart regulatory mix governing corporations.
While the codes were based originally on voluntary adherence by
companies to international soft law instruments such as the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (dating from 1976) and the
InternationalLabour Organization (lLO) TripartiteDeclaration (dating
from 1977), increasingly, governance and compliance-oriented soft and
hard laws, including but not limited to criminal, administrative, and
private laws, stimulate or even require companies to adopt codes of
conduct, to monitor compliance and to enforce them. In this sense,
corporate codes must be characterized increasingly as co-regulation
* Professor A. Jan A.J. Eijsbouts, former Group General Counsel and Legal
Director of AkzoNobel, a Dutch multinational, and former Chair of the CLO Round
Tables Europe and North America, is Professor of Corporate Social Responsibility
and Professorial Fellow at the Institute for Corporate Law, Governance and
Innovation Policies (ICGI) of the Law Faculty of Maastricht University. This article
is an expanded version of the presentation by the author at the Workshop "Enforcing
Corporate Social Responsibility: Transforming Voluntary Corporate Codes Into
Private Law Obligations," a workshop on research by the UM-HiiL-Chair on the
Internationalisation of Law, held at Maastricht on 17 October 2014." The author is
grateful to Anna Beckers, Mark Kawakami, and Mieke Olaerts for their valuable
comments and suggestions.
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instruments, mandated by soft and hard law as meta-regulation. Thus,
the still widely held view, that the codes are merely voluntary
instruments must be challenged on two levels: first, adoption of a code as
corporate governance and CSR instrument is for many companies no
longer voluntary, and, second, the content of the code is no longer
optional in many respects.
In order to enable the reader to appreciate the implications of these
paradigmaticchanges for corporate codes of conduct, this contribution
will first briefly address these paradigmatic changes. Following these
preliminary remarks, this contribution will describe the code's place in
the corporate governance regulatory framework as one of the primary
governance tools for the company. This contribution will also describe
how meta-regulation has transformed corporate codes from pure selfregulation to responsive co-regulation. In conclusion, this contribution
will analyze the implications of this transformationprocess for corporate
management and it will address best practices in creating, monitoring,
and enforcing the codes along with their identified problems through a
legal and a business organizationallens.
INTRODUCTION

This contribution resulted from a workshop dedicated to the
research of Dr. Anna Beckers on the national enforcement of global
corporate codes.1 Corporate codes of conduct have two main distinct
functions: an external societal legitimacy function and an internal
governance function. Both functions have different legal backgrounds
and implications. In her research, Beckers focused on the external
legitimacy function of voluntary CSR codes, which she defined as
voluntary declarations of companies that contain substantive standards
on specific corporate social responsibility aspects. 2 She explored avenues
for possible enforcement thereof in private law in the relation between
the corporation and third parties. In particular, she concentrated her
research on the private law doctrines in the fields of unilateral
obligations, contract, and tort law comparatively in Germany and in the
United Kingdom. She excluded the commitments laid down in corporate
codes with respect to the internal relations within a corporate
organization, in particular the codes' impact on the rights and
obligations of managers, shareholders, and employees.3 She based this
exclusion not only on the practical reason to limit the scope of her
1. See ANNA BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES: ON
GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 30 (2015).
2. Id. at 24.
3. Id. at 30, 31.
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research, but also for the conceptual reason, that the relevant legal
questions and theoretical issues involved are different between the
internal and external relations. Complementing Beckers's important
work on the external legal dimension of the codes, this contribution will
focus on the internal legal dimension and the internal regulatory
governance and responsibility implications for corporate codes as
managerial instruments. For a start, it is important to emphasize that
enforcement in this internal legal dimension has two components:
enforcement by external regulators of the company's compliance with its
duties relating to the creation, monitoring, and enforcement of the code
on the one hand, and complementary enforcement by the company itself
of compliance with the code on the other hand. The contribution's
overall argument will suggest that this internal legal dimension may
even make a stronger case for enforcement of corporate codes in many
instances than the external legal dimension explored by Beckers.
Corporate codes of conduct have gained a prominent role as selfregulatory tools that enable companies to comply with their corporate
responsibilities, which are becoming increasingly important in the
context of globalization. As the name suggests, codes of conduct
essentially codify basic values, norms, and rules that govern the conduct
of directors, managers, employees, and-increasingly- suppliers. These
values and norms consist of company-specific private norms
complemented by relevant soft and hard law. From a legal point of view,
two observations are important: first, the still widely proclaimed view in
business circles that corporate social responsibilities are purely
voluntary by nature, is no longer tenable, and, second, corporate social
responsibilities have become intrinsic elements of corporate governance.
As I will illustrate, both observations have far-reaching
consequences for the raison d'6tre, nature, and scope of corporate codes
as essential managerial tools in governance and CSR. 4 The purpose of
this contribution is to zoom in on the legal and regulatory aspects
relevant for the design and enforcement of the corporate codes.
Therefore, Section I will summarily explore these aspects of CSR and its
corporate governance context relevant for the taxonomy of the corporate
codes. From a legal substantive point of view, these aspects can be

4. For a study concluding that CSR codes are in practice overwhelmingly corporate
governance codes, see Krista Bondy, Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, MNC Codes of
Conduct: CSR or Corporate Governance?, INT'L CTR. CORP. Soc. RESP. RES. PAPER SERIES,
No. 40-2006 (2006). The conclusion of this study must be attributed to the still existing
dichotomy at the time between the concepts of corporate governance and CSR. If the
currently promoted inclusive description of corporate governance, encompassing the
concept of CSR as an integrated element, had gained recognition at the time, this
conclusion might have been framed differently.
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distinguished mainly in three areas of law: corporate and securities law,
employment law, and a series of CSR-related specific laws, including
human rights, anticorruption, antitrust, and privacy laws.
In Section II, this contribution will address the changing nature of
corporate codes from purely self-regulatory tools through public metaregulation to co-regulatory instruments against the background of the
developments mentioned in Section I. Section III will deal with the
codification and implementation process of corporate codes through a
legal and organizational lens. Section IV will conclude by claiming that
the voluntary nature of corporate codes is no longer valid in two
respects: first, for many corporations, the adoption of a corporate code
has become mandatory, and, second, increasingly the emergence of
international and national norms has had a converging and
harmonizing effect, rendering important elements in the contents of the
code no longer optional.5 This may in turn have implications for the
external dimension of corporate codes and reinforce Beckers's
conclusions.
I. THE INCLUSIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-BASED REGULATORY
CONTEXT OF CORPORATE CODES.

A. Inclusive CorporateGovernance as the Basis for the Code of Conduct
In the introduction two relevant observations were made: CSR can
no longer be characterized as purely voluntary and it has become an
integral aspect of corporate governance. Both of these assertions have
far-reaching consequences for corporate codes of conduct as pivotal
instruments in governance. These observations need substantiation.
The first observation can be exemplified by the European
Commission's adoption of a new definition of CSR in 2011: the
responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society. 6 Contrary to
the Commission's 7 2001 CSR definition, this new definition no longer
5. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening InternationalRegulation
Through TransnationalNew Governance: Overcoming the OrchestrationDeficit, 42 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 506 n.25 (2009) (stating that the new transnational regulatory
frameworks "are 'voluntary' in the sense that they are not legally required; however, firms
often adhere because of pressure from NGOs, customer requirements, industry association
rules, and other forces that render them mandatory in practice").
6. A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 6, COM
(2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Renewed EU Strategy].
7. Cf. Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social
Responsibility, at 6, COM (2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001) (defining CSR as "a concept
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis").
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contains the reference to a voluntary basis of CSR. The Commission
stipulates: "[tihe development of CSR should be led by enterprises
themselves. Public authorities should play a supporting role through a
smart mix of voluntary measures and, where necessary, complementary
legislation, for example to promote transparency, create market
incentives for responsible business conduct and insure corporate
accountability."
This means that substantive CSR standards may crystallize in some
form of regulation,8 including hard law, and in fact many substantive
CSR standards have already reached that stage. Voluntarism is
therefore merely a matter of form and not a matter of substance as the
many CSR definitions still reflect.9
The second observation, the development of a CSR inclusive concept
of corporate governance, can be illustrated best by the following quote
from the Preamble of the 2015 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance:
The Principles recognize the interests of employees and
other stakeholders and their important role in
contributing to the long-term success and performance of
the company. Other factors relevant to a company's
decision-making processes, such as environmental, anticorruption or ethical concerns, are considered in the
Principles but are treated more explicitly in a number of
other instruments including the OECD Guidelines for
8. For a definition of "crystallization," see Donald Casey & Cohn Scott, The
Crystallization of Regulatory Norms, 38 J.L. & Soc'Y 76, 77 (2011). It was written in the
context of the Transnational Law and Private Actors project of the Hague Institute for the
Internationalization of Law HiiL. Casey and Scott clarify: "Crystallization is the process
through which fluids are solidified, starting from a nucleus and then growing in a fashion
which assumes a regular pattern in a very marked contrast to the boundaries from which
it emerged. A process of crystallization thus gives shape to what was previously shapeless,
defining and giving significance to elements of the structure. Drawing on this process, our
particular understanding of the crystallization of norms suggests a process by which
norms take on regulatory effect." Id. at 77.
9. In an analysis of no less than 37 different CSR definitions and descriptions of CSR
in 2006 Dahlsrud found seven common features, the first common aspect for the major
part in these definitions being the claimed voluntary nature. See Alexander Dahlsrud,
How Corporate Social Responsibility Is Defined& An Analysis of 37 Definitions, 15 CORP.
Soc. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 1, 4-11 (2008). For criticism of the voluntary nature of CSR,
in particular of the EU approach of 2001, see Olivier de Schutter, Corporate Social
Responsibility European Style, 14 EUR. LAw J. 203 (2008); and my inaugural lecture, Jan
Eijsbouts, Professor Corp. Soc. Responsibility, Faculty of Law at Maastricht Univ.,
Inaugural Lecture: Corporate Responsibility, Beyond Voluntarism: Regulatory Options to
Reinforce the License to Operate, (Oct. 20, 2011) (transcript available at
http/pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl/eef02f49-5frB7-45f8-bl3c-263cefifD7d4).
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Multinational
Enterprises,
the
Convention
on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, which are referenced in the Principles. 10

The conclusion is that the traditional, narrow concept of corporate
governance as a set of norms, principles, and rules on the distribution of
powers between management, supervision, and shareholders, must be
understood in a broader way. This broader view considers governance
and CSR as an integral normative framework that adds to the narrow
question of "who holds the reins?"," the additional consideration of, in
the author's words, "what constitutes good corporate governance
decisions intrinsically?"

10. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], G20/OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance, at 10 (Sept. 2015) [hereinafter Principles of Corporate Governance],
www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf.
Next to specifying the
international substantive CSR norms as codified in the referenced frameworks, the quote
also confirms the increasing attention for stakeholders in corporate governance, which has
been more elaborated in Chapter IV on The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate
Governance. Id. at 37. This chapter refers among other things to the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises for due diligence procedures that address the impact of
commitments to stakeholders and concern over corporate reputation and corporate
performance requiring recognition of broader interests. Id.; see also Org. for Econ. CoOperation and Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011)
[hereinafter Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises],http//oeccorg/mrporate/mne/oecd
guidelinesformultinationalenterprises.htm.
Chapter V on Disclosure and Transparency
emphasizes the importance of disclosure in improving the public understanding of
performance with respect to environmental and ethical standards and companies'
relationships with the communities in which they operate. Principles of Corporate
Governance at 41. Again reference is made to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, which may be relevant for multinationals in many jurisdictions. Id. at 42.
Companies are also "encouraged to disclose policies and performance relating to business
ethics, the environment and, where material to the company, social issues, human rights
and other public policy commitments." Id. at 43. Reference is made to mandatory
disclosure of non-financials in many jurisdictions. Id. Finally, in Chapter VI on the
Responsibilities of the Board, the principles state that "boards are expected to take due
regard of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder [(than shareholder)] interests including
those of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and local communities." Id. at 51.
11. See generally INT'L CAPITAL MKTS. GRP., WHO HOLDS THE REINS?: AN OVERVIEW OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE IN JAPAN, GERMANY, FRANCE, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: CONTRASTING IMPRESSIONS OF PRESENT-

DAY PRACTICE AND CURRENT ISSUES (1995) (reviewing the corporate governance standards
in six countries).
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I shall refer to this new concept as the inclusive corporate
governance concept. 12 This concept can be exemplified by the following
quote by Sir Adrian Cadbury, the Chairman of the first UK Corporate
Governance Commission:
Corporate governance is concerned with holding the
balance between economic and social goals and between
individual and communal goals. The governance
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of
resources and equally to require accountability for the
stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as
nearly as possible the interests of individuals,
corporations and society.' 3
B. CorporateCodes as Pivotal Instruments in the Smart Inclusive
GovernanceMix
Corporate codes are documents developed by and for a company as
guidelines for the current and future behavior of its directors,
managers, and employees and come in many different forms, under
different names, and covering different topics. 14 Typically, they also

&

12. See Mervyn King, Foreword, A Corporate Governance Model: Building Responsible
Boards and Sustainable Businesses, 17 Global Corporate Governance Forum (2010),
available at httpJi/ww.ife.org/wps/wcm/onnect/1fl2cl8048a7e72daa5fef6060ad5911/GCGF
%2BPSO%2Bissue%2B17%2B34-10.pdf?MOD-AJPERES.
13. Adrian Cadbury, Foreward to MAGDI R. ISKANDER & NADEREH CHAMLOU,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION, 3, 4 (2000); see also Mia
Mahmudur Rahim, Legal Regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility: A MetaRegulation Approach of Law for Raising CSR in a Weak Economy (providing ample
supporting material and reasoning for the contention that CSR is an integral core aspect
of the broader vision of corporate governance), in CSR, SUSTAINABILITY, ETHICS
GOVERNANCE 1, 13-44 (Samuel 0. Idowu & Ren6 Schmidpeter eds., 2013); Cynthia A.
Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance (providing a
descriptive overview of the developments in the corporate world and reviewing empirical
financial evidence on companies' implementing CSR initiatives), in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds.,
forthcoming 2017), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2635473.
14. For a comprehensive overview of corporate codes, see KPMG, BUSINESS CODES OF
THE GLOB. 200: THEIR PREVALENCE, CONTENT AND EMBEDDING (2008). Org. for Econ. CoOperation and Dev. [OECD], Corporate Responsibility: Private Initiatives and Public
Goals (2001). For one of the most comprehensive studies on the subject, see Org. for Econ.
Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Corporate Responsibility: Private Initiatives and Public
Goals (2001). In that study, the OECD defines a Code of Conduct as "commitments
voluntarily made by companies, associations or other entities, which put forward standard
and principles for the conduct of business activities in the marketplace." Id. at 48. This
definition so drafted, which includes self-imposed obligations and negotiated instruments,
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contain relevant corporate social responsibilities1 5 as perceived by the
company's management, driven or influenced by society through either
democratic regulation or legitimate societal standards of expected
conduct.
The corporation must find ways to identify and codify-where
appropriate and in a manner befitting to the company-its legal and
semi-legal obligations as well as the relevant social norms. The
corporate code over the years has become the pivotal instrument in this
framework, typically containing the values, norms, and rules that the
multinational corporation has identified as being essential for business
conduct by all acting in its name or for its risk. In this way, the
corporate code is an important document that contains the identity of
the company and is a prerequisite nowadays for responsible
management of the institution. Living up to and publishing this identity
in turn is the basis for obtaining the required legitimacy from society
and, hence, a critically important instrument in the process to obtain
and keep both its legal and its social license to operate.' 6
comparable with the OECD's definition of corporate governance, raises two observations.
Id. First, the voluntary aspect is emphasized just like the EU Commission's 2001 CSR
definition, but this qualification meets the same criticism as the said EU CSR definition.
Id. Moreover it is only outward oriented by its focus on business activities in the
marketplace, but does not refer to rules and principles covering the internal dimension of
corporate governance and responsibility. Id.; cf. BECKERS, supra note 1, at 318 ("Corporate
codes have to be interpreted as strategic reactions to internalise the institutionalised
social expectations. . ."). So from this external or outward oriented perspective, corporate
codes are a form of responsive private regulation.
15. From a legal and regulatory point of view it would be more appropriate to refer to
the plural "corporate social responsibilities", hence my preferred wording here. For an
overall review of the development of corporate codes of conduct and self-regulation in the
CSR arena, see Rhys Jenkins, U.N. Research Inst. for Soc. Dev., Tech., Bus. and Soc'y
Programme, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in a Global Economy (Apr.
2001); Phillip H. Rudolph, The History, Variations, Impact and Future of Self-Regulation,
in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

OF THE 21ST

CENTURY 365 (Ramon Mullerat ed., 2005). See also Martijn W. Scheltema, Assessing
Effectiveness of InternationalPrivateRegulation in the CSR Arena, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L.
& Bus. 263; Marie-Claire & Jan Vranken, Gedragscodes in een Meergelaagd Privaatrecht
in

Europa en Nederland,

in GEDRAGSCODES

IN

INTERNATIONAAL,

EUROPEES

EN

PRIVAATRECHTELIJK PERSPECTIEF 7 (describing the many functions of corporate codes). On
the legal aspects of corporate codes, see generally BECKERS, supra note 1; Carola Glinski,
Corporate Codes of Conduct: Moral or Legal Obligations?, in THE NEW CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY:

CORPORATE

SOCIAL

RESPONSIBILITY

AND

THE

LAW

119

(Doreen

McBarnet et al. eds., 2007); Claes Lundblad, Some Legal Dimensionsof Corporate Codes of
Conduct, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE
21ST CENTURY 385.

16. On the concept of the license to operate, consisting of a social and a legal license
and their interaction, see Neil Gunningham, Corporate Environmental Responsibility:
Law and the Limits of Voluntarism,

in THE

NEW

CORPORATE

ACCOUNTABILITY:
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Taking CSR as a container concept, for codes of conduct to be
analyzed from a legal or regulatory perspective, one needs to take a
closer look at both the substantive social norms this concept comprises
as well as the legal or regulatory forms' 7 into which each of these social
norms may crystallize. This crystallization process of social norms into
one or more of these forms of regulation has already taken place
considerably in all substantive CSR aspects, and, influenced by
8
globalization, this process is forging ahead with increasing speed.' The
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW, supra note 16, at 476; Eijsbouts, supra
note 9, at 30-34. On the social license, see JOHN MORRISON, THE SOCIAL LICENCE: HOW TO
KEEP YOUR ORGANISATION LEGITIMATE (2014). For an early practical example, also see
Our Credo Values, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, http://www.jnj.com/about-jnj/jnj-credo (last

visited Sep. 18, 2016). In Section III, this article will address the relevance of involving
major stakeholders in the development of the company's custom made code.
17. See Principlesof Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at 13, for a description of the

corporate governance framework: "Effective corporate governance requires a sound legal,
regulatory and institutional framework that market participants can rely on when they
establish their private contractual relations. This corporate governance framework
typically comprises elements of legislation, regulation, self-regulatory arrangements,
voluntary commitments and business practices that are the result of a country's specific
circumstances, history and tradition. The desirable mix between legislation, regulation,
self-regulation, voluntary standards, etc., will therefore vary from country to country."
18. Substantive CSR norms may crystallize in hard law in all its manifestations as the
wide scope of CSR topics in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises illustrate.
In this connection the Guidelines, in paragraph I of Chapter 1, Concepts and Principles, state
that "Observance of the Guidelines by enterprises is voluntary and not legally enforceable.
Nevertheless, some matters covered by the Guidelines may also be regulated by national law
or international commitments". And indeed, in many instances they have found their way in
international commitments and national hard law, such as the CSR substantive norms in
human rights, employment, environment, corruption, competition and tax, all of which are
both the subject of corresponding specialized chapters in the Guidelines and of national hard
laws. So this can take the form of Triple P (People, Planet or Profit) specific legislation, but
also in a more general way through private law, administrative law and criminal law. An
example in the field of disclosure (Chapter III in the Guidelines) is the 2014 EU Directive on
the mandatory disclosure of so-called non-financials. Non-financials include impacts by the
company's activity relating to environmental issues, social and employee issues, human
rights compliance, and anti-corruption and bribery matters (on this Directive, see also
Section II.C below). Particularly in private law, substantive CSR norms may become
legally relevant in the interpretation of open or blanket norms, such as good faith in
contract law, the reasonableness test in tort law and good management in corporate law.
See Jan M. Smits, Enforcing CorporateSocial Responsibility Codes Under PrivateLaw, or:
On the DiscipliningPower of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 181, 202 n.50

(2017). This latter aspect is referred to by the EU Commission when it addresses the
accountability aspect in its strategy communication. See Renewed EU Strategy, supra note
7, at 7. One of the important themes for research is how these substantive social norms
could crystallize into the hard law segments of the regulatory mix. Codes may have legal
effect in two ways. Insofar as they reflect international or national best practices based on
hard or soft law originating from public authority sources they may inform the courts as
authoritative norms in their interpretation in the national hard law of open or blanket
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corporate code of conduct is the primary form of self-regulation in this
smart regulatory mix. 19
II. TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CODES FROM SELF-REGULATION INTO
CO-REGULATION INSTRUMENTS BY PUBLIC SOFT AND HARD METAREGULATION.

Originally, corporate codes were voluntary in the sense that
corporations were free, from a legal point of view, to decide to adopt a
code of conduct or not and to determine its contents in the event that
they did. However, an increasing number of international soft law
instruments followed by hard law prescriptive provisions that legally
require the adoption of corporate codes render the "voluntary" label
inaccurate. In terms of the nature of the prescriptive and normative
regulatory basis of the corporate codes, this underlying basis could be
described best as meta-regulation20 transforming the once voluntary
norms. As an example in the People sector of CSR, the Dutch Enterprise Chamber at the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal based one of its judgments on the public adoption by a
multinational of the OECD Guidelines. In the employees' successful appeal against the
multinational's decision to close a manufacturing plant in Amsterdam, the court paid
attention to the fact that the multinational had not applied the principle of due
consultation of the OECD Guidelines, OK 21 June 1979, NJ 1980, 71 (Batco, m.nt.
Maeijer). Insofar as the codes reflect industry best practices they may also have legal
effect to be established by the courts in open norms, except that the normative strength
does not come from the authoritative international or national public sources but either
from the reflective strengths of the code norms representing the accepted best practices in
the given industry or trade or, if put on the company's website or publicly divulged
otherwise, from the assumed promise or assurance by the company to abide by its code.
See Beckers, INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION AND PRACTICE,,180, 181

1

4.2.1.3.(2015).

19. For the various regulatory forms in which substantive CSR norms may crystallize,
see Eijsbouts, supra note 9, at 17-22. The deconstruction through crystallization in all
possible regulatory forms of the substantive CSR norm "don't bribe foreign officials" is
used as example. Id. For a different integral typology of corporate responsibilities
emphasizing that they comprise both non-legal and legal responsibilities, see Archie B.
Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management
of Organizational Stakeholders, 34 BUS. HORIZONS 39 (1991). On the legal pluralist

character of the corporate codes, see Gunther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of
Multinationals: Company

Constitutions Beyond

Corporate Governance and

Co-

Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND 203

(Rainer Nickel ed., 2010). For a critical note on the role of social norms in relation to the
enforcement of CSR codes see Smits, supra note 19, at 3; and Tineke Lambooy, Corporate
Law and CSR: Will There Be a Constitutionfor Multinational Companies in 2030?, in THE
LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 273 (Muller et al. eds., 2011).
20. See Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 16, at 207; Martin
Herberg, Global Legal Pluralism and Interlegality: Environmental Self-Regulation in
Multinational Enterprises as Global Law-Making, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-

CORPORATE CODES AS PRIVATE CO-REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

191

self-regulatory corporate codes into instruments of co-regulation. 21
Meta-regulation and co-regulation are related concepts. Both are a
combination of hard or soft public international or national framework
law and the required, encouraged, or induced implementing selfregulation.
A. InternationalSoft Law Relevant for CorporateCodes
Multinational corporations laid the geopolitical developments
starting in the beginning of the nineteen-seventies to pave the way for
what we now refer to as the corporate codes of conduct. New members of
the United Nations, often developing states emerging from the
decolonization process after World War II, insisted in the context of a
proposed New International Economic Order on the creation by the U.N.
of a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations. A U.N. working
group started work, and, after a long period of difficult negotiations, a
draft U.N. Code of Conduct resulted in 1990. Under the aegis of the
Washington Consensus, however, the drafting process coincided with
the upcoming deregulation mode in the developed countries, and as a
consequence the draft Code was shelved in 1990.22 As a side effect of
this complicated U.N. process, negotiations on an investment protection
instrument for the OECD member states resulted in the 1976
Declaration on International Investment. As a quid pro quo, the OECD
member states agreed on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises as annex to the declaration. 23 The OECD member states
committed themselves to recommend that their multinationals comply
with the Guidelines on a nonbinding basis. Many multinational
corporations adopted "rudimentary" codes of conduct in response to the
publication of this first edition of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, but in many instances these codes of conduct
had hardly any consequence for actual management of corporations.
Moreover, transparency on internal regulations was underdeveloped

GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 17, 18 (Olaf Dilling

et al. eds., 2008).
21. On soft law and co-regulation, see Linda Senden, Soft Law, Self-Regulation, and
Co-Regulation in European Law: Where Do They Meet?, 9 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1
(2005). For a good overview of the concepts of self-regulation and co-regulation in the
governance-responsibility context, see Mahmudur Rahim, supra note 13, at 25-34.
22. For the history of the UN draft Code, see generally Karl P. Sauvant, The
Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations:
Experience and Lessons Learned, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 11 (2015).
23. Text of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment(May
25,
2011),
Enterprises, OECD
polcy/oecddeclarationoninternationalinvestmentandmultinationalenterprises.htm.
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pre-Internet. Over the years, however, the OECD Guidelines became
more specified, and the institution of National Contact Points in the
OECD member states and other adhering countries supported
promotion and monitoring. Nowadays, these Guidelines are the most
extensive and developed international soft law CSR instrument and
serve for many corporations as a model for their corporate code of
conduct.
The recently revised G20/OECD Corporate Governance Principles
refer to corporate codes in connection with the requirement to apply
high ethical standards and to take stakeholder interests into account.
The Principles state that many companies have found it useful to
develop a code of conduct-or sometimes even a broader code of
behavior-based on professional standards in order to make the
objectives of the board clear and operational and to communicate them
throughout the organization. These codes might include a voluntary
commitment by the company, including its subsidiaries, to comply with
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which reflect all
four principles contained in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principlesand Rights at Work. Moreover, company-wide codes serve as
a standard for conduct by both the board and key executives, setting the
framework for the exercise of judgment in dealing with varying and
often conflicting constituencies. At a minimum, the ethical code should
set clear limits on the pursuit of private interests, including dealings in
the shares of the company. An overall framework for ethical conduct
goes beyond compliance with the law, which should always be a
fundamental requirement. 24 This latter aspect, mentioned by the
Principles, is of course especially important in a globalization context,
where relevant law either may not exist or may not be enforced. This
lack of law, or of law enforcement, gives rise to the so-called governance
or accountability gap. 25 The inclusive corporate governance model must
24. See Principlesof Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at 53.
25. This is mostly referred to as the governance gap for multinationals in international
law. See Sbbastien Jodoin, Crimes Against Present and Future Generations: Ending
Corporate Impunity for All Serious Violations of InternationalLaw; in THE LAW OF THE
FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW, supra. note 19, at 634-35. But see STEPHEN TULLY,
CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (2007) (highlighting the increasing role of

corporations in international public law); Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001) (same); Int'l Council on
Hum. Rts. Pol'y [ICHRP], Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the Developing
InternationalLegal Obligationsof Companies (Feb. 2002), http://reliefweb.int/sites
/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F7FA1F4A174F76AF8525741F006839D4ICHRPBeyond%20
Voluntarism.pdf (same). Now that multinationals have been recognized as relevant actors
in the shaping of the transnational architecture of global economic regulation, Beckers
provided a convincing rationale for corporate codes to fill the formal governance gap for
multinationals in international politics and public law. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 47.
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be seen here as a gap filler as long as and to the extent that
international public law or national law of the home country of the
multinational corporation is not taking over this important role.
The soft meta-regulation character of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and the ILO Core conventions, which have
had their influence on the content and the intensity of implementing
and monitoring the corporate codes, has served as a driver, initially for
the adoption and later for the specification of content of the corporate
codes.
The most important development in this context, however, has been
the unanimous endorsement by the U.N. Human Rights Council of the
U.N. Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework on the relation of
Business and Human Rights of 2008 and of the U.N. Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights of 2011. The Corporate Responsibility to
Respect Human Rights, one of the three pillars of the U.N. Guiding
Principles is, from a normative point of view, a "global standard of
expected conduct" as noted by its author, John Ruggie in his capacity as
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on the issue of
human rights and business. 26 The ILO Declaration and OECD
27
Guidelines are international soft law.

B. NationalHard Law Relevant for CorporateCodes
From a normative point of view, even more important for the
transformation of the corporate codes into essential corporate
governance instruments have been developments in hard law. The rise
of corporate codes as internal disciplining, risk management, and values
setting instruments in inclusive corporate governance was a welcome
development for law makers and regulators, who by prescription could
turn the codes into co-regulation instruments mandated by their hard
meta-regulation.
26. See U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, Commentary
to principle 11, at 13, U.N. Doc. AJHRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
27. From a normative standpoint, it is relevant to acknowledge that the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights, although the UN Guiding Principles which contain
this responsibility have been endorsed unanimously by the UN Human Rights Council,
has been proposed by John Ruggie and are not the product of a regular council
preparatory process and decision procedure, hence the endorsement rather than adoption
by the council. Of course, the adoption of this corporate responsibility in soft law
instruments, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in its 2011
update, provides it with soft law status. See generally Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, supra note 10 (outlining ways multinational enterprises invest in economic,
social, and environmental progress).
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The most important form of meta-regulation requiring the adoption
of corporate codes has been the introduction of the U.S. Congressional
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (FSG) of 1991.28 These
Guidelines contain a very important impetus, not only for U.S. but also
for non-U.S. multinationals subject to the frequently "long-arm"
jurisdiction by the US courts, to adopt standards and procedures to
achieve and maintain compliance with the law. Originally, the FSG
were aimed at criminal law. 29 The corporate scandals at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, most notably ENRON and its collapse,
however, prompted extensive legislation to discipline corporate boards
and management in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. With respect to
corporate codes, two important developments must be mentioned. First,
listed companies should adopt a code of ethics for senior financial
officers. 30 Although the Act only provided that a company should
disclose publicly whether it had such a code and, if not, why, in 2003 the
SEC ruled that the NYSE and the NASDAQ require the adoption of a
code of conduct applicable to directors, managers, and all employees.
Through the application of these rules to so-called foreign issuers, these

28. U.S.

SENTENCING

COMM'N,

8B21,

2011

FEDERAL

SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

MANUAL (2011), http //www.uss&gov/Guidelines/011_guidelines/ManualHTMUJ8b21.hltm;
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,

§

see also

3E1. 1, GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 2015), http//www.uss.gov

/guidelinesmanual/organizational-guidelines.
29. These played an important role in the enforcement of particular antitrust laws and,
since a decade, also in anti-corruption laws, notably the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2016).
30. See Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2016). Part (a)
states: "The Commission shall issue rules to require each issuer, together with periodic
reports required pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reason therefor, such issuer has adopted a code
of ethics for senior financial officers, applicable to its principal financial officer and
comptroller or principal accounting officer, or persons performing similar functions." Part
(c) provides the following definition for code of ethics: "such standards as are reasonably
necessary to promote (1) honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of
actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships;
(2) full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in the periodic reports
required to be filed by the issuer; and (3) compliance with applicable governmental rules
and regulations." The SEC was tasked with the details and supervision of this process to
be rolled out by the US stock exchanges. In 2003, the SEC expanded the requirement by
ruling that the adoption of the code of ethics became mandatory and that it should be
extended with two more standards (prompt reporting of violations of the accountability for
adherence to the Code) and should apply to all directors, officers, and employees. See
generally Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the
Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253 (2005) (exploring the effect of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on corporate codes of ethics and the corporate legal environment).
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rules had an extensive extraterritorial effect involving many foreign
companies, which also had to adopt corporate codes. 31
Second, the Congressional Sentencing Commission was tasked with
a review of the FSG aiming at a more comprehensive legal and ethical
compliance architecture for corporations. In this review the Commission
broadened the FSG scope of recommended application also to laws other
than just criminal law, emphasizing the crucial importance of an ethical
corporate culture. The corporate code of conduct reflecting the basic
values and ethical principles of the company became the main business
ethics and legal compliance instrument.
The long-term societal objective of the FSG, the promotion of good
corporate citizenship and more ethical business cultures beyond the
reduction and prevention of crime, their original short-term goal,
became more explicitly addressed by these new ethical and legal
compliance program requirements. These FSG compliance program
requirements became important aspects in U.S. and increasingly nonU.S. corporate life as vital tools to live up to the fiduciary duty, in
particular the duty of care, of corporate boards and management. This
transpired from legislative actions of the U.S. Congress, bringing the
FSG in the center of corporate governance through the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. Congress also adopted improvements of
sectorial legislation, such as the antitrust and anticorruption laws,
notably the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Both are clear examples of
hard law provisions codifying two core substantive CSR social norms,
fair competition, and no bribery. 32
If robustly monitored and enforced, the compliance program,
centered around the code of conduct, may seriously positively impact the
culpability score of the corporation in the criminal sanctioning by the
31. See

N.Y.

STOCK

EXCH.,

LISTED

COMPANY

MANUAL

303A.11

(2009)

http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/bookmark.asp?id=sx-ruling-nyse-policymanual_3
&manual=/1cm/sections/lcm-sections/; NASDAQ, MARKETPLACE RuLES 4350(n) (2006)
(deleted 2012) http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/bookmark.asp?id=nasdaqrule_4000&manual=/nasdaq/main/nasdaq-equityrules/. For foreign issuers home practice
is allowed, but they must disclose in their annual report or on their websites any
significant ways in which their corporate governance practices differ from those followed
by US companies. Id.
32. Through the 1997 OECD Convention Combatting Bribery, the FCPA approach
became the norm also in the other OECD member and additional signatory states. See
OECD, Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions(Nov. 21, 1997), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombat
BriberyENG.pdf. The most recent example for a corporate requirement to have a
compliance program in the field of bribery comes from the UK and their UK Bribery Act.
See UK Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23
/pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf (explicitly mentioning effective compliance programs as a
valid corporate defense in bribery allegations).
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courts and the prosecution, leading to leniency and possibly even
amnesty. 33 Generally, a well-designed and enforced compliance program
based on a comprehensive corporate code may support the presumption
in court of the management's fulfillment of its duty of care, while the
opposite may support the presumption of negligence in this respect.
Also, enforcement decisions by the courts, the Department of Justice,
and the U.S. regulatory agencies can be mentioned. 34
C. InternationalHard Law Relevant for CorporateCodes
On the international level, an important recent example of
European Union hard law meta-regulation promoting transparency in
the field of CSR, mentioned by the European Commission in its 2011
communication, 35 is the 2014 EU Directive on the mandatory disclosure
of so-called non-financials. Non-financials include impacts by the
company's activity relating to environmental issues, social and
employee issues, human rights compliance, and anti-corruption and
bribery matters.3 6
33. For the positive impact of a robust compliance program on the fines, see 2011
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 29. In determining the
Culpability Score as one of the factors to determine the fine, see id. at § 8C2.5, it is
important whether the organization had an effective compliance and ethics program with
the code of conduct as the pivotal instrument, see id. at § 8B2.1. See, for instance, in the
field of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act the guidance by the US Department of
Justice: CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & ENF'T DIV., SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, A
RESOURCE
GUIDE TO THE
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012),
https/vww.justice.gov/sites/defaultilmescriminal-fraud/egacy/2015/0116/guide.pdf (Guidance by the
US Department of justice over the FCPA). Note also, that the European Commission still
does not consider robust compliance programs as a leniency factor in its antitrust
enforcement and fining practice.
34. Cf. Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (recognizing the value of
effective compliance programs and prompt corrective action as part of an affirmative
company defense to a sexual harassment suit under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996) (admonishing governing authorities to heed FSGO compliance program features).
Also note United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which the US Supreme Court
decided that the FSGO could only be considered as advisory rather than mandatory, which
did not affect their importance as an internal control tool. See also JOHN R. STEER,
FEDERAL

INTEGRATING AN ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING MODEL INTO A COMPREHENSIVE COMPLIANCE
AND ETHICS PROGRAM: SCCE HIGHER EDUCATION COMPLIANCE CONFERENCE 10 (2014),

&

http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-trainingseminar/2014/steerslideshow.pdf.
35. See Renewed EU Strategy, supranote 6.
36. Regarding disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large
undertakings and groups, see Council Directive 2014/95, art. 19a, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1, 3,
4 (EU), available at httpJ/eur-lex.europa.euegal-cntent/ENIXPuri-CELEX-32014L095 (stating
the threshold for companies subject to this directive is: 500 employees and C20 million
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As a consultation document for the preparation of nonbinding
guidelines for this new "inclusive" reporting framework by the EU
Commission summarizes:
the Directive has been designed in a non-prescriptive
manner, and leaves significant flexibility for companies
to disclose relevant information in the way that they
consider most useful. Companies may rely on national
frameworks, Union-based frameworks such as the Eco(EMAS),
or
Audit
Scheme
and
Management
international frameworks such as the United Nations
(UN) Global Compact, the Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights implementing the UN
'Protect, Respect and Remedy' Framework, the
and
Co-operation
Economic
for
Organisation
Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational
Organisation
for
the International
Enterprises,
Standardisation's ISO 26000, the International Labour
Organisation's Tripartite Declaration of principles
concerning multinational enterprises and social policy,
the Global Reporting Initiative, or other recognized
international frameworks (recital 9). Companies may
also consider the sectorial OECD Due Diligence
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, as
appropriate.37
This example shows how the combination of meta-regulating hard
law, prescribing disclosure of important non-financial information, and
international substantive soft law and multi-stakeholder frameworks is
driving the way in which companies organize their internal norms and
rule creation and their compliance management processes. In this
context, it is important to reiterate that soft law and self-regulation,
although not legally binding, may have legal effect.38

balance sheet or C40 million net turnover). EU member states must implement the
Directive in their national law with effect from the year 2017.
37. Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital
Markets Union, Consultation Document: Non-Binding Guidelines for Reporting of NonFinancialInformation by Companies, at 4 (2016), http://ec.europa.eulfinance/consultations
/2016/non-financial-reporting-guidelines/docs/consultation-document en.pdf.
38. See supra note 18 for the ways this legal effect can be achieved.
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D. Supply Chain Responsibility and CorporateCodes
An increasingly important reason for companies to adopt an
extensive code of conduct is the dilution in the last couple of decades,
influenced by globalization, of corporate functions. Corporations have
developed from vertically integrated organizations into global
multiparty networks, including various parties at different stages in
their value chain, all the way from the conception of new products in
research to the sale of the end-product to the industrial buyer or
consumer. This development has influenced the global societal
expectations regarding responsibilities of multinationals in the context
of human rights and CSR more generally. Their economic, financial,
political power, and the pivotal roles that they play in the networked
value chains in the global marketplace have resulted in the extension of
their governance and CSR responsibilities to their supply chains. The
U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights explicitly
stipulate this extended corporate responsibility. 3 In addition, the
adoption in 2011, even before the unanimous endorsement by the U.N.
Human Rights Council of the Guiding principles, of this responsibility
in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises confirms this
extension as subsequent NCP-cases have shown. Many corporations
have taken this responsibility seriously and introduced sourcing policies
and practices by which they extend their corporate codes to their supply
chain. 40 The acceptance by many international garment companies of
obligations in the Bangladesh Alliance and Accord, arrangements to
improve the manufacturing conditions in the Bangladesh garment
industry in the aftermath of the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster, illustrate
this development.
III. "A CODE IS NOTHING, CODING AND LIVING IT IS EVERYTHING"
Well-managed companies will ensure that their internal governance
and CSR framework reflects the legitimate expectations of society with
respect to their responsibilities and contribution to society both in terms
of shared value creation and in terms of internalizing or adequately
managing externalities, as the obligations on their part under their
corporate social contract. This is the contractual consideration for the
39. See U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, at 6, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011); Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra note

10, at 3-4.
40. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Commercial
Contracts:New Architectures, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1557, 1564, 1580-84, 1598 (2013).
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legal and operational frameworks offered by society to corporations
enabling and facilitating them to conduct their business. 41 Living up to
the corporate social contract between business and society will secure
businesses' much-needed license to operate.
Simply complying with the laws in the many countries where
multinationals conduct their operations is not sufficient for them to
secure their license to operate. Next to securing their legal license by
legal compliance, securing the social license often needs even more
attention since the consequences of a breach of its terms may be more
severe than the consequences of not observing the terms of the legal
license. Shell, for instance, experienced this when it announced the plan
to sink the Brent Spar in the Atlantic. 42 In summary, each company is
expected to develop its customized CSR profile, drafted in accordance
with the authoritative international normative frameworks.
A. The Sources of Substantive Norms Relevant for the Content of the
Code of Conduct and Their Assessment for the Company's Customized
CSR Profile
Since CSR as a container concept of a multitude of substantive
social norms, varying both in time and place, means different things for
different companies, each company must define its customized CSR
profile. This assessment of the relevant substantive CSR norms is a
process of contextualization: each company will have to analyze its
position based on its specific industrial characteristics and the given
societal context. Companies will have to accomplish this through a
continuing dialogue with the relevant stakeholders in that same
context. An oil company obtaining or using a production license in an
agricultural or forest region in a developing country has a different CSR
profile than when it obtains and/or uses a production license in deep
waters. And this in turn is quite different from a pharmaceutical
company opting to conduct its clinical testing in a developing country
41. See generally THOMAS DONALDSON,

CORPORATIONS & MORALITY (1982) (arguing

that society allows businesses to receive privileges from society, including limited liability,
as long as the benefits society receives from the businesses outweighs the costs to society);
THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE,
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999) (same).

TIES THAT BAND: A SOCIAL CONTRACT

42. See Brian Molloy, Case Study: The Environmental Conflict Surrounding the
Decommissioning of Brent Spar, availableat https://www.iaea.org/nuccomtoolbox/docume
nts/BrentSpar CaseStudy.pdf.. I note that in this case Greenpeace, which mobilized the
courts of public opinion very effectively, acknowledged later that the facts on which they
based their claim against Shell apparently had not been correct. This raises the question
on the accountability of NGO's, the most sophisticated of which have adopted their codes
of conduct in the meantime.
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rather than in its home country. An IT company, again, has a different
CSR profile when it opts to outsource its production to a developing
country than when it sells an internet access system to a country with a
totalitarian regime.
When it comes to the identification of substantive norms relevant
for its code of conduct, each company may have to make a ranking of
norms. The approach can be two-fold. From a positive law perspective
one may give preference to hard law obligations as the core of the
compliance risks and add the relevant legitimate societal expectations
as they become manifest, most clearly in the international CSR and
human rights frameworks. But the more appropriate approach is the
reverse since the codes aim at setting global values, norms, and rules
relevant for the company. In the latter case, hard law, in a CSR context
frequently resulting from a state duty to implement international public
law obligations, is the complementary solidification of the ethical
content of the societal values. Hence, this contribution takes the
international first approach.
The most important international source of general normative
standards is the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, the
second pillar in the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, and, in the words of their author John Ruggie, "a global
standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they
operate." 43 This responsibility requires companies to provide for an
adequate due diligence process as defined in the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights.
The two other normative international frameworks are the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises 2011. The main concept, developed in the context of the
U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to substantiate
the company's contextual corporate responsibility to respect human
rights, is the due diligence process aimed at the human rights risks for
third parties (to be) caused by the (contemplated) decisions and actions
of the company. By focusing specifically on the risks to third parties,
this due diligence differs from the conventional due diligence process
used by companies in their business plans, which generally applies in
the context of merger and acquisitions and in assessing the risks for the
company itself. Of course a risk for third parties can also translate into
a risk for the company itself, and hence this due diligence concept has a
dual purpose, but the main focus, at least with regards to this
contribution, is the risk on the part of third parties. The 2011 update of

43. GuidingPrincipleson Business and Human Rights, supra note 26.
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the OECD Guidelines, aimed at adhering to the U.N. Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights, introduced a similar due diligence
concept, both for the corporate responsibility to respect human rights
and for most other topics, albeit for the latter in a less strict way."
In addition to these three normative international frameworks,
three managerial international frameworks may assist the company in
assessing its CSR profile. 44 These are the U.N. Global Compact, 45 the
ISO 26000 Guidelines on CSR, 46 and the GRI Integrated Reporting
Initiative. 47 All three have embraced the normative corporate
responsibility to respect human rights from the U.N. Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights, but they have also developed practical
procedures for companies to identify relevant aspects for their human
rights and wider CSR impacts, by focusing in a specified way on the
various substantive CSR aspects. The GRI G3.1 framework, for
example, has deconstructed the substantive CSR norms in the form of
about 125 key performance indicators (KPIs), which can be used by
companies as a checklist to build up their customized CSR profile and to
report on the relevant aspects of their external CSR reporting. 48 Once
44. See EC Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, An Analysis of Policy
References made by large EU Companies to InternationallyRecognised CSR Guidelines
and Principles, Ref. Ares (2015) 2100451 (2013). This distinction between the normative
and the managerial frameworks is relevant from a legal point of view since as
international soft law the three normative frameworks apply regardless of whether the
company decides to abide by them or to adopt them in its corporate code and ethical and
legal compliance set up. On the other hand, as voluntary multi-stakeholder initiatives, the
UN Global Compact, the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard, and the GRI framework are
instruments of self-regulation in the sense that they are optional managerial tools and
companies are free to decide whether or not to sign up in the case of the Compact and to
adopt in the case of the ISO 26000 Guidance and GRI. See generally U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT, GUIDE TO CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY: SHAPING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (2015),

httpsJ/www.unglobalwmpacLorg/dostpublications/UN GlobaLCompact
GuidetoCorporateSustainability.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE TO CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY];
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE [GRI], SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES (2011),

https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1-Guidelines-InclTechnicalProtocol.pdf
[hereinafter G3 REPORTING GUIDELINES]; INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION [ISO], ISO

26000 - SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

(2010), httpsJvww.iso.org/obphil#so:shiso26000-ed-v1:en

[hereinafter ISO SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY].

45. Of course, after signing up, the company must abide by the compliance rules of the
Compact and publish yearly its Communication of Progress regarding the Compact's ten
principles at the risk of being de-listed. See GUIDE TO CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY, supra
note 44, at 40.
46. See ISO SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44.
47. See G3 REPORTING GUIDELINES, supra note 44

48. This is even more important for companies subject to the 2014 EU Directive on
reporting of non-financials. See Council Directive, supra note 36. It should be noted,
however, that GRI's successor G4 Reporting Guidelines no longer contain the checklist of
KPI's, heavily criticized for adhering too much on metrics and indicators, but now focus on
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the relevant KPIs have been identified, the company will be able to
consult, both internally and externally, relevant stakeholders to check
whether the plans to avoid or mitigate negative impacts are adequate
and sufficient. As empirical analysis has shown, the public or collective
private frameworks are important sources for the content of the codes of
conduct. 49
This process will enable the company's management to establish the
company's CSR profile as the base material for the corporate code, both
in terms of the corporate values and in terms of a customized risk
profile.5 o This CSR profile should ultimately serve as the basis for the
code of conduct that sets forth the company's values and its
responsibilities toward the stakeholders and to the society at large, not
to mention toward its employees and business partners as well.
B. The Compliance and Enforcement Frameworkfor the Code of Conduct
Before establishing the code, the management should check the
draft internally with operational middle management, 5' employee
materiality levels in the Triple-P areas as triggers for the contemplated integrated
reporting. See generally GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE [GRI], G4 SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING GUIDELINES: REPORTING PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD DISCLOSURES (2013),
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Partl-Reporting-Principles-andStandard-Disclosures.pdf (focusing on economic, environmental, and social categories of
disclosures) [hereinafter G4 REPORTING GUIDELINES]. As mentioned, however, the GRI 3.1
list could still be very useful by offering an extensive checklist, further breaking down the
substantive CSR Triple-P scope into detailed elements, which can assist each company in
assessing which of these substantive elements are relevant in establishing its customized
CSR profile.
49. See EC Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, An Analysis of Policy
References made by large EU Companies to InternationallyRecognised CSR Guidelines
and Principles, Ref. Ares (2015)2100451 (2013) (presenting statistics on how randomly
selected large companies from different EU Member States make public policy references
to internationally-recognized CSR principles). Also note that the EU Commission's CSR
Strategy 2011-2014 clarifies that there is no "one size fits all" and that for most SME's the
CSR process remains informal, complying with legislation and collective agreements with
social partners. See Renewed EU Strategy, supra note 6, at 6.
50. For an analysis of major corporate governance and CSR codes, which may assist
companies in selecting the right benchmark for their coding process, see Egbert
Dommerholt, Corporate Sustainability Performance: Constructs, Measures and Investors'
Responses, (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vrije Universiteit). See also KPMG,
THE
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200

9,

12,

22-27

(2014),

https://www.kpmg.com/BE/en/IssuesAndlnsights/ArticlesPubhcations/Documents/TheBusiness-codes-of-the-Fortune-Global-200.pdf.
51. The maxim is "tone at the top", see Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens, Muel Kaptein & J.
(Hans) van Oosterhout, Contracts to Communities: A ProcessualModel of Organizational
Virtue 18 (Erasmus Research Inst. of Mgmt., No. ERIS-2007-023-ORG, 2007), but middle
management is important for culture in complex organizations, see id. at 22.
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representative bodies, 52 and externally with representatives of relevant
NGOs in order to be certain-to the extent possible-that the code has
the buy-in from the relevant internal and external stakeholders. The
next phase is communication with and training of the employees,
which-at least initially-can be done through dilemma workshops.
This will signal the importance the management attaches to the values,
principles, rules, and compliance of the corporation.5 3
The next step is to monitor compliance with the code. This should
ideally be done by yearly confirmation by all employees with managerial
responsibility that their organizational unit has complied with the code,
and if not, in what respects the code has been breached and what
remedial measures have been taken. This exercise is frequently called
the letter of representation on non-financials, which is prepared bottomup leading to consolidated country and/or business unit letters to top
management. The relevant member of top management and the chief
compliance officer will review the yearly consolidated business or
country report with the responsible manager as basis for the company's
compliance report to the supervisory board or, in the case of a one-tier
board structure, to the nonexecutive members.
It is also possible to make adherence to the code a part of the
employment conditions and/or require the employees to yearly confirm
that they have complied with the code and have reported instances of
noncompliance to management or, if that is not possible, to the
compliance officer. 54 Whistleblowing procedures should be established
that would enable correct reporting and careful investigation of code
violations. Company retaliation in response to bona fide reports is not
permitted.5 5 Experience by the author in this respect leads to the
conclusion that particular attention must be paid by senior
management to this latter point.
Violators of substantive provisions of the code must be sanctioned,
but this is not always legally possible depending on the labor laws of the

52. In quite a few countries, consultation with the employee representative bodies such
as Works Councils on the national level (e.g., in France, Germany and The Netherlands)
or, for EU wide corporations, the European Works Council, is mandatory. Consent may
even be required as in the Netherlands.
53. The financial letter of representation, initially developed to back up the
management assurances to the auditors in their yearly audit of the group's annual
financial report, is routinely prepared by the financial accounting departments and
similarly cascaded up to the consolidated financial letter of representation. (This is widely
followed practice, not prescribed by law.)
54. Please note that this aspect needs careful preparatory study in each of the
jurisdictions in which the corporation has employees.
55. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2016) (providing for the
mandatory protection of whistleblowers).
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country of the relevant employee 56 or, alternatively, not practical in
order to make sure that the company secures the cooperation by the
employee with the internal or authorities' investigation of the
compliance issue 5
The code compliance status over the preceding financial year should
be reported in the annual report, ideally in the form of an integrated
report,5 8 but otherwise in a separate CSR or sustainability report. The
number of substantive noncompliance incidents experienced by the
company in the year in each of the code areas-such as corruption,
antitrust, discrimination, misappropriation of company assets, conflict
of interest issues-can be reported with remedial measures undertaken
by the management.
Finally, the corporate code may also be used as a basis for supply
chain management in the sourcing process as basic reference material.
The various forms in which the codes may perform this role in the
sourcing process are well researched, both from an operational and legal
point of view. The operational alternatives range from simple reference
in the communication process via reference in the sourcing contracts as
general conditions to adopting the code as integral part of the supply
contracts. In the latter case, the buying company may use monitoring
and enforcing methods ranging from weak, via medium, to strong. 5

56. For conflict of laws complications, see Larry CatA Backer, Economic Globalization
and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global
Legislator 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1748 (2007), which describes how internal enforcement
of a code at Wal-Mart failed due to the labor law system in Germany (co-determination,
compliance with the constitution). This may be contrasted with the Dutch BATCO
judgment of 1982 in which non-compliance with the employee consultation provisions of
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by the British American Tobacco
group notwithstanding the group's publicly declared commitment to the guidelines helped
the employees in barring the intended closure of BATCO's Amsterdam plant. See
Amsterdam Court of Appeal's Enterprise Chamber 9 March 1978, NJ 1978, 220 (Ned.).
57. Relevant in this context is also the recent change in focus by the US Department of
Justice with respect to sanctioning corporate wrongdoing by targeting individual directors,
officers and employees involved in the compliance issues. See Memorandum from Sally
Quillian Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, on Individual Accountability for
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.
58. The GRI G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines are well suited for creating such
integrated reports. See G4 REPORTING GUIDELINES, supra note 50. Companies subject to
the EU Directive on Disclosure of Non-financials 2014 are well served by GRI's publication
connecting the G4 guidelines to the Directive. See generally GLOBAL REPORTING
INITIATIVE [GRI], MAKING HEADWAY IN EUROPE, LINKING GRI's G4 GUIDELINES AND THE
EUROPEAN
DIRECTIVE ON
NONFINANCIAL
AND DIVERSITY
DISCLOSURE
(2014),

https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4_EU%20Directive LinkageNew%20Logo.pdf.
59. For comprehensive legal comparative and empirical research, including a thorough
analysis of the monitoring and enforcement methods, covering the supply chain
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Periodic review of whether the code of conduct still reflects the
company values as these may have developed over time in line with
applicable regulation or legitimate societal expectations is of, course, a
must. The same applies with respect to the training materials for
employees. A coding and implementation process so organized will keep
the company's corporate social contract and license to operate intact and
up to date.
CONCLUSION

Over the years, the code of conduct has become a core element in the
corporate constitution of all major corporate groups, first of all as a tool
for control and risk management but also as a means of creating an
ethical corporate culture by embedding values.6 0 Although many
descriptions of corporate codes emphasize their external function as an
instrument of accountability,6 1 the conclusion of this contribution is that
the internal governance role 62 is the primary reason for well-run
companies to engage in a well-designed process of coding and
implementation today. The so-called voluntary nature no longer
accurately reflects the reality, since nowadays, good corporate
governance in general and specific hard law require many companies to
actually establish a code. Moreover, while in the past companies had the
flexibility to draw up their own custom codes, this flexibility is being
developments such as
constrained by external
increasingly
international soft law, national hard law, and by societal expectations,
which are perpetually evolving. Corporate codes, if well-designed,
properly embedded, and routinely enforced, play an increasingly
important role in the inclusive corporate governance concept, thereby
fulfilling various CSR objectives.
The steps in the process of coding and living the code mentioned in
section III support the claim by Anna Beckers that corporate codes must
be taken more seriously indeed, not only in response to her
recommendations but also in compliance with soft and hard governance
and CSR law.

contracting practices of multinationals in the Netherlands, England, and California, see
the doctoral thesis A.L. VYTOPIL, CONTRACTUAL CONTROL IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: ON
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODES OF CONDUCT, CONTRACTS AND (AVOIDING)
LIABILITY (2015).

60.
61.
62.
codes:
policy

See Teubner, supra note 19, at 203-04.
See Glinski, supranote 15, at 120-21.
See Menting & Vranken, supra note 15, at 25 (listing the functions of corporate
corporate governance, harmonization, reference framework, general conditions,
instrumental, complementary, compliance, assurance, and so forth).

